Relatives of the 29 miners killed in the April 5, 2010, explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia have every right to be angry that no criminal charges will be forthcoming against Massey Energy, the mine’s former owner, for safety violations that put the miners at risk

Even though the victims’ families each will be receiving $500,000 under a settlement reached between the mine’s new owners and the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the still-grieving families are understandably shocked that criminal charges against the company will not be pursued.

Although Massey, which was bought by Alpha Natural Resources in June, cannot be held criminally liable under the settlement, some former Massey employees might be, according to an Associated Press report on the settlement.

How all of that will play out remains uncertain. However, one important point made during Tuesday’s announcement of the settlement should spawn close study by Congress. That is that MSHA, at the time of the Upper Big Branch tragedy, lacked the authority to permanently close mines at which serious safety violations were commonplace and ongoing.

And MSHA still lacks that power today.

That needs to change.

MSHA should have the power to permanently close mines with many serious safety issues, as long as an appropriate appeals process is in place.

Investigators found 370 safety violations related to the fatal explosion. MSHA administrator Kevin Stricklin noted on Tuesday that, in the year before the fatal blast, the agency issued more violation orders at Upper Big Branch than at any other mine.

In connection with those orders, MSHA shut down the mine 48 times during that year but, because it lacked authority to close it permanently, it was required to let it reopen when detected problems seemingly were fixed.

But the lack of authority regarding permanent closure allowed Massey to continue to be careless and irresponsible with its employees’ well-being — and that culminated with the fatal explosion

In their final report, federal regulators blamed the blast on a series of basic safety violations and said the explosion was preventable.

The mine safety agency said Massey engaged in “systematic, intentional and aggressive efforts” to conceal life-threatening problems. According to MSHA, Massey managers went so far as to maintain two sets of pre-shift inspection books — an accurate one for the company and a fake one for regulators. They also habitually warned miners underground when an inspector arrived, so crews could make the mine appear safe.

“We thought we were keeping accidents from happening,” Stricklin said of his agency’s efforts, despite its admittedly limited power. What happened on April 5, 2010, reinforced the fact that the agency’s power is too limited in dealing with extreme cases of irresponsible conduct and neglect by mine operators.

“I want to see people go to jail because this was preventable,” said Gene Jones, whose twin brother Dean died in the explosion.

With that apparently not going to happen, the deceased miners’ families should shift their attention to pressing for stronger powers for MSHA.

The Mine Safety and Health Administration can’t live up to its name if, in reality, it is limited in its ability to carry out its mission.

The 29 deceased miners are testimony to the needed change.