A new report from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General indicates the Secret Service missed opportunities to prevent and disrupt the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt that wounded now-President Donald Trump and killed Buffalo Township firefighter Corey Comperatore.

The report made seven recommendations based on the results of five findings. Those findings and the related recommendations from the report are detailed below:

– The Secret Service never detected Crooks’ 9-minute drone flight.

– The Secret Service had planned for an onsite counter drone system, but it was manned by a single under-trained operator. The operator did not test the system ahead of July 13, 2024.

– The system malfunctioned, resulting in the operator spending several hours attempting to resolve the issue.

– While working with customer service, the technical support representative emailed the operator saying, “I’ve marked this matter as high priority... but... we have limited support during the weekends.”

Recommendation 1: We recommend the Aviation and Airspace Security Division develop and implement a process for submitting counter drone operator request denials for leadership review.

Recommendation 2: We recommend Aviation and Airspace Security Division create training standards for protective divisions operating counter drone systems, including training on repairing malfunctioning counter drone systems.

Recommendation 3: We recommend Aviation and Airspace Security Division coordinate with counter drone vendors to ensure they have sufficient technical support staff available to meet Secret Service protective mission needs

– Secret Service did not receive 102 radio transmissions from local law enforcement as they launched an “increasingly intense search for a suspicious person.”

– The Secret Service received five phone calls and three text messages about Crooks.

– The Secret Service did not establish a joint communications room with all law enforcement agencies.

– President Trump’s protective detail was not alerted about concerns of a suspicious person.

– Protective detail members said if Secret Service had told them about the search for a suspicious person, they would have delayed his speech or removed him from the stage.

– The “Communications” section in Secret Service’s Protective Operations Manual and other training tells Secret Service to effectively communicate by establishing a communications room with state and local law enforcement agencies.

Recommendation 4: We recommend Office of Protective Operations update policies for planning event security to require communications room staff to inform protective detail about searches for suspicious persons.

– Because of a threat identified ahead of July 13, Secret Service had assigned counter snipers to the rally on July 13, 2026, but did not assign additional personnel.

Recommendation 5: We recommend the Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division develop and implement policy and procedures for receiving and requesting permission to share intelligence with field offices assigned to events, and ensuring timely and efficient dissemination of classified intelligence with cleared, onsite Secret Service personnel.

– Area outside the perimeter was not secured by Secret Service despite being provided a plan from local law enforcement that detailed gaps in security.

Recommendation 6: We recommend Office of Protective Operations update its policy on coordination with partner law enforcement agencies to require lead and site agents review and confirm state and local law enforcement’s positions before an event.

– Secret Service did not confirm whether campaign staff had placed equipment that would have blocked line of sight from the AGR complex’s roof to the stage. This gave Crooks an unobstructed line of sight at the distance of 155 yards to the stage.

Recommendation 7: We recommend Office of Protective Operations develop and implement a process to document the identification and blocking of line of sight vulnerabilities and the approval of mitigation plans before events.

The Department of Homeland Security’s report indicated the Secret Service concurred with the recommendations. The report said recommendations 1, 4, and 6 were “resolved and closed” while recommendations 2, 3, 5, and 7 were “resolved and open.”