Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrestles with questions as Ukraine's counteroffensive grinds on
There was good news and bad news for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
The good news: Ukraine will finally be receiving the F-16 fighter jets it so desperately wants. This is an especially welcoming development for Zelenskyy, who has spent a significant amount of time and attention traveling to Western capitals with a wish list of military equipment in his pocket.
"F-16 will certainly give new energy, confidence and motivation to fighters and civilians," Zelenskyy told Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, the first European head of government to authorize a transfer of the aircraft. "I'm sure it will deliver new results for Ukraine and the entire Europe."
The bad news, however, is that the risks outweigh the good. Despite the latest donations in Western military aid, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been slower and bloodier and more wearisome than many analysts and commentators expected. While Zelenskyy is doing what leaders do by putting up a positive front and insisting that his troops will, over time, wear down the Russian army, the current realities on the battlefield are undeniable: The Ukrainians are losing a lot of men and equipment trying to pierce fortifications the Russians have had months to construct.
The Ukrainians have recaptured about 81 square miles since early June, so the counteroffensive hasn't been a total wash. Yet in a war of attrition as violently chaotic as the one in Ukraine, resources expended are just as important as any tactical territorial gains. If the Ukrainians are recapturing land at a high cost, one question arises: Do they have enough gas in the tank to keep what they have in the event the Russians themselves counterattack?
Ukrainian officials are understandably upset about all the armchair generals nitpicking their strategy at a time when hundreds of Ukrainian troops are dying every week. (There were some reports, unconfirmed, that hundreds were dying every day during the first phase of the counteroffensive.) Speaking to the German tabloid Bild on Saturday, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba insisted that analysts ought to stop being so confident in their projections. "We don't need to prove anything; our success will reward optimists while ruining the reputation of doubters," he remarked.
If this exasperation sounds familiar, that's because it is. Two months ago, Zelenskyy suggested to the BBC that observers who wanted quick success were watching too many war movies. The overall line you get from the Ukrainian government is that success may not be around the corner, but with patience, determination and more weapons from the U.S. and NATO, it's all but guaranteed.
One can't blame Ukrainian officials for feeling this way. Ukrainians, after all, are in the middle of a fight for their lives against an opponent, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who doesn't even buy the notion that Ukraine is a legitimate state. One of the reasons Zelenskyy's administration continues to reject the notion of peace talks with Moscow is because it thinks that anything less than a full, unconditional Ukrainian military victory would provide Putin a lifeline to resume his aggression at some later date. The Ukrainians are not at the point in which end-of-war negotiations with Moscow are feasible.
But one must ask the question nobody in Kyiv wants to answer: If the counteroffensive continues at its current pace or runs up against a wall of Russian resistance, does the previously unthinkable become a viable policy option? At what point does the most unpopular choice on the table — gritting your teeth and sitting down with the Russians to work out some type of diplomatic arrangement — become necessary?
Granted, we aren't at that point yet. The Ukrainians are firm in their stance: The Russian invaders will be expelled and held accountable for their crimes. The fact that Zelenskyy is adamant that his 10-point peace plan — which, let's face it, is a bunch of surrender terms dressed up in diplomatic garnish — is the only one up for consideration strongly suggests he still believes the Ukrainians can again shock the world by breaching the Russian army's defensive lines and destroying its logistical system. Indeed, this is precisely what Kyiv is trying to accomplish: Reach the Sea of Azov, split Russian-occupied territory in two, and gradually put pressure on Crimea until Putin makes the calculation that it's less costly to leave than maintain a continuous presence there.
But we need to be honest about this scenario. Based on practical facts, the probability of accomplishing such a feat appears quite low. The Ukrainians still haven't reached Russia's first line of defense — and even when they do, there are two more lines to go through. This isn't to say that Russia's defensive positions are impenetrable — rather, only that breaking through them may be prohibitively costly for a Ukrainian army with limited numbers that is reliant on the West for everything from tanks and mine-clearing vehicles to artillery. As much as Zelenskyy would like to bank on U.S. military support over the long term, it would be dangerous for him to do so; according to a CNN poll released in early August, a majority of Americans now oppose Congress authorizing additional military aid to Kyiv.
The Ukrainians are therefore in a tough spot. They need to demonstrate progress to their Western sponsors in order to keep the aid spigot flowing but not be so desperate that they make bad decisions on the battlefield that degrade their military strength. It's a very delicate balancing act for any leader to confront, let alone Zelenskyy, who has embedded the inevitability of military victory in the minds of his people.
One question left outstanding is whether Zelenskyy can do a 180-degree pivot if total victory becomes a mirage.
Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune
