For President Joe Biden, a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia is the Holy Grail of diplomatic deals in the Middle East.

Normalization would have positive ripple effects throughout the region, fully incorporate Israel into the Middle East’s political order and bring the White House a significant foreign policy win less than a year before the 2024 presidential election campaign gets underway.

That’s the conventional wisdom. But is it correct? How beneficial would an Israeli-Saudi normalization accord actually be for the U. S.? Would it be as groundbreaking to the regional order as we are led to believe? And what would Washington have to concede to make it happen?

One would hope the Biden administration is asking all of these questions as U.S. officials travel to Saudi Arabia to cajole Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman into making history.

What can’t be questioned is the degree to which the White House is interested in bringing Israel and Saudi Arabia, arguably its two closest security partners, into a formal embrace. In May, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan visited the kingdom, followed by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s shuttle diplomacy in June, when he briefed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on what Riyadh may be willing to consider. Sullivan made a return trip to Saudi Arabia last week in what was billed as an attempt to “advance a common vision” for a more secure and peaceful Middle East. The Biden administration is trying to hash it all out by the end of the year.

The practicalities are difficult, to say the least. In addition to the compressed time frame, a lot will have to go right. Prince Mohammed considers himself a transformational figure and would theoretically like to see Riyadh establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel. But the Saudis are highly unlikely to do this without landing some concrete assurances to the Palestinian Authority in the process. In other words, Israel-Saudi normalization will happen only if Israel is willing to provide the Palestinian Authority with a diplomatic win as well. What form those concessions would take is anybody’s guess, but examples could include allowing the authority to administer more territory in the West Bank, capping settlement expansion in territory the Palestinians claim for a future state or promising to end unilateral Israeli counterterrorism operations in areas that the Palestinian Authority nominally controls.

The problem is that all of these concessions could be politically treacherous for Netanyahu, who leads a coalition opposed to the very notion of a Palestinian state. Even Biden, who prefers to settle differences with Israel in private, lamented that some of Israel’s ministers are the most extreme he has ever seen. Would Netanyahu, the definition of a political survivor, do his part if it meant jeopardizing a job he reclaimed just nine months ago?

Then there is the question of whether a formal diplomatic normalization accord orchestrated by the U.S. is even needed. The Israelis and Saudis have made considerable progress improving bilateral ties on their own over the years. A relationship that was traditionally seen as adversarial is now anything but. Sure, the two countries still have their issues, particularly on the Palestinian issue. But the lack of progress on Mideast peace hasn’t prevented Riyadh from gradually working with Israel when its interests call for it.

Israeli and Saudi intelligence agencies have been cooperating with one another for quite a long time, and that once discreet relationship is slowly making its way into the public domain. Last year, Saudi Arabia agreed to allow Israeli aircraft to travel through Saudi airspace on their way to other destinations. Israeli business leaders have been invited to the kingdom and courted as potential investors, and rumors of Riyadh investing in Israel are never far away. The fact is that Israel and Saudi Arabia may not even need the U.S. to push them together; realpolitik is a powerful force.

The most problematic aspect of a potential Israeli-Saudi normalization deal, however, is what the U.S. would have to concede to make it happen. Prince Mohammed knows full well that the Biden administration wants an agreement, and he’s prepared to milk it for all it’s worth. Normal relations with Israel won’t come cheap. According to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, the Saudis want the U.S. to grant them a NATO-style defense treaty that would require the U.S. to come to the kingdom’s defense in the event of an attack; U.S. support for a Saudi nuclear program that includes the right to enrich; and more access to U.S. weapons platforms such as the world-renowned Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile defense system.

This would be a huge lift for any U.S. president, let alone Biden, who has a long history of being one of the more high-profile skeptics of the kingdom in Washington. It’s doubtful the average American would sympathize with, let alone support, sending U.S. soldiers to fight and die for a country that continues to leverage its status as the world’s swing oil producer to raise prices at the pump. If the price of Israeli-Saudi normalization is turning U.S. soldiers into security guards for the ruling family, then the trade-off simply isn’t worth it.

Addressing campaign supporters on Friday, Biden declared cautious confidence that two of the region’s most powerful states were edging toward a new era. Exciting stuff. But he needs to ensure that the cost Washington is willing to pay is not disproportionate.

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Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.