Back in September, when the severity of the financial crisis was becoming clear, officials in Washington, D.C., began to prop up failing businesses in the banking and insurance industries. A few months later, two of the three domestic carmakers were lining up for billions of dollars.

The concept behind the taxpayer support for these troubled companies, which have made risky financial bets or bad decisions, is that they were "too big to fail."

In practical terms, the public has come to understand that the failure of one or more of these mega-corporations could trigger other failures that, in turn, could result in catastrophic damage to the U.S. and global economies.

But when the financial crisis has passed and market conditions stabilize, there should be a national debate over the idea of "too big to fail." Most people today would suggest that a company that is "too big to fail" is simply too big.

Acceptance of the "too big to fail" theory gives the managers of a few very large businesses the idea that they cannot fail, or will not be allowed to fail, even if they make bad decisions. This insulation from consequences such as bankruptcy or liquidation surely leads to unnecesary risk-taking.

It also can be argued that companies that perceive themselves as too big to fail have a competitive advantage over others in their industry.

And companies that are in the "too big to fail" category probably have too much political clout too.

Acceptance of the "too big to fail" policy might now be serving to protect the economy from calamity, but it also serves to insulate top executives and managers from believing that there will be consequences for bad decisions. And the elimination of the fear of failure can lead to bad decisions.

Congress or relevant federal agencies should determine which companies are considered too big to fail. And then plans should be developed for breaking those giant corporations into units that are not too big to fail.

The attention of the nation and top political leaders in Washington is rightly focused on navigating through the current crisis. But when the crisis has eased and the bailouts ended, the consequences of "too big to fail" must be fully understood.

Over the past decade or so, the consolidation of giant financial firms seemed inevitable, and maybe even beneficial. We were told that bigger is better, and that efficiencies and cost savings from giant mergers would benefit consumers. But we now are seeing that such concentration of power and market share has forced taxpayers to assume hundreds of billions of dollars in debt to prevent these firms from collapsing.

If Citigroup, AIG or GM, for example, were to be broken into a number of smaller, but still-large companies, then maybe one of those companies, if it made risky investments or bad decisions, could be allowed to fail. And once it was understood that no company is too large to fail, managers would be more careful and more responsible. Failure would be a tonic for companies intoxicated by big profits and big risks.

Because business today is global, such a response to "too big to fail" would have to be adopted by other nations, or U.S. companies might be at a competitive disadvantage.

Despite the complexities of the issue, it is worth tackling. The costs of "too big to fail" are all too clear.