English backs 'Trade Lawyers' Relief Act of 2006'
There's more to Congress than high-profile corruption scandals. There's also the commoditized grade of scandal known as "business as usual" on Capitol Hill.
Earlier this month, Rep. Phil English, R-Pa., introduced some of the most cynical anti-trade legislation in recent memory. His bill, the Trade Law Reform Act of 2006, is the latest example of how international trade and U.S. trade partners are routinely vilified to run interference for ulterior objectives. In this case, the hidden agenda is more reprehensible than usual.
In introducing the bill, English deployed some of the same rhetoric that has been refuted time and again: "Failing to update our outdated trade laws allows foreign countries to continue robbing Americans of their jobs," he said. "Now is the time to fix the law to serve our interests, not those of predatory trading partners."
Among other things, the bill calls for significantly lowering the already lax evidentiary thresholds required to impose trade remedy measures, such as antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard protection. But who's clamoring for trade remedy protection these days? Whose interests does Congressman English mean by "our interests"?
In English's district of Erie, Pa., the unemployment rate of 5.1 percent is slightly higher than the national rate of 4.6 percent, but is downward trending and still well below the average in each of the past four decades. No, it's not the jobs of his Erie constituents or the country's manufacturing workers that English's bill seeks to protect. They don't need protection from trade competition. Rather, it's Washington's underutilized trade lawyers who reap the benefits of this proposal.
There's been a lot of talk within the trade community recently about the paucity of new trade remedy cases. In fact, there has been only one U.S. antidumping initiation this year, and only four over the last 12 months, which is a major decline from the one or two per month we've witnessed over the past several years. And there has been only one countervailing duty case initiated during the past year and no safeguard cases since 2002. Combine those trends with the recent detente in the U.S.-Canada softwood lumber dispute (i.e., the asbestos case of the trade bar) and you have a sudden glut of starving trade lawyers.
The reduction in trade remedy cases is attributable to a few laudable developments. First, the U.S. economy has been growing steadily for more than four years now. The U.S. steel industry — accounting for the preponderance of antidumping cases — is healthier than it has been for decades. Under those circumstances, it's difficult to make the case that a domestic industry is being injured (one of the stubborn requirements of winning trade remedy protection).
Second, as globalization has progressed, supply chains have gone international. The once clear definition of a domestic industry has been blurred by the fact that production of a final product often takes place in multiple countries. Antidumping suits have a greater downside now, as domestic petitioners are more likely to ensnare an entity in their own supply chain or relate to them in some other way.
And third, as the world economy has expanded, producers now have many more sales opportunities around the globe. Emerging demand in previously flat markets has caused sales managers to rethink their strategies: Fewer are pursuing a strategy of competing on price in the United States, and more are looking to be early entrants in developing markets.
English and the trade lawyers who support his bill could admit a fourth reason. Last year, the Congress finally revoked a law called the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, otherwise known as the Byrd Amendment, which had been found to violate various international agreements by the World Trade Organization more than two years earlier.
Under Byrd, duties collected in trade remedy cases were directed into the coffers of the domestic firms that supported the trade remedy petition. That process made it much easier for law firms to persuade clients to file petitions since the collected duties would offset the legal costs, and in many cases provide windfalls to the companies supporting the petition. A letter from a law firm with a large trade practice attempting to coax a U.S. lumber mill into supporting a countervailing duty petition was submitted as evidence in the WTO case that ultimately led to Byrd's repudiation.
With the Byrd Amendment no longer available to help stoke demand for trade remedies and U.S. economic conditions currently unfavorable to a finding of domestic injury, the petitioners' bar is scrambling to drum up business. That's where English's bill comes in. By loosening the statutory requirements to impose protection, petitioners' lawyers would have a reformulated product to sell.
It might be different from taking bribes, but changing the statute for the express purpose of encouraging litigation is still scandalous.
