In a recent letter to The Kansas City Star, a writer couldn't understand why auto workers were blamed for the car companies' problems.

Workers don't design cars, he wrote. They don't set prices or decide where cars are made. The key decisions are made by top management.

I found this to be a startling assertion. The UAW has approved substantial give-backs in the recent restructuring, but surely most auto workers understand that they, through their union, played a role in the demise of General Motors and Chrysler.

Only by continuing their current, more pragmatic posture can they play a role in Detroit's revival.

I asked Jeff Manning, president of the United Auto Workers' Local 31 — based at GM's Fairfax plant in Kansas City, Kan. — whether he agreed with the letter writer. He did.

Manning said he tells UAW members at Fairfax they had "nothing to do with the demise of General Motors."

"I feel it's my job to do what I can to make sure (GM's) a profitable company," he continued. "But there's only so much we can do. We do the jobs we're asked to do and put the quality in there we can. . . . If GM decided it wanted to build helicopters, we'd build helicopters."

True, GM designed and priced the cars, but company decisions were made within a dynamic in which the union wielded tremendous influence, not to mention brute force. In tough negotiations, the union could and did threaten a strike — the equivalent of a gun to management's head.

Ultimately, management is accountable and management made more than its share of boneheaded moves. GM produced look-alike models, made dumb acquisitions and was slow to upgrade quality.

But many questionable decisions were prompted by union pressure. In retrospect, management should have taken a strike or two rather than give in to some of these demands.

Take the jobs bank, a contract provision in which the company agreed to pay laid-off employees who were no longer working. Manning says the goal was to deter the company from sending UAW jobs overseas; the company knew that if it wanted to shut down a plant, it had to keep paying the employees.

But the spectacle of companies paying people not to work became a symbol of the burdensome costs that eroded the Detroit carmakers' competitiveness. In 2005, more than 12,000 laid-off UAW members were receiving 95 percent of their pay under the program.

The jobs bank was finally put to rest last year, as part of union efforts to help alleviate the industry crisis.

The union imperative is to protect as many jobs as possible, regardless of cost.

Paul Ingrassia, former Detroit bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal, writes that Ford once sent a team of welding experts to a factory to provide tips on how to boost efficiency. But the initiative went nowhere because the plant's union leaders refused to meet with the team; the union feared efficiency moves would lead to layoffs.

An auto worker I know writes that at his plant, he has been told often to "slow down." An electrician can't fix a water leak, even if it might take only a few seconds with a screwdriver. Instead, a pipefitter must be summoned. If too many people become too efficient, the company might not need as many employees.

That kind of workplace culture might have been viable in the 1970s, when the UAW had a de facto labor monopoly in the U.S. auto market. But not after the arrival of Toyota and Honda and others — companies that operate in largely non-union plants.

Some of the industry's costs have been rolled back by recent amendments to the labor agreement. The UAW agreed to a wage freeze and cuts in retirement benefits, and pledged not to strike. No cuts were imposed in hourly pay, but work rules and job classifications were simplified. Chrysler and GM should emerge from bankruptcy with spruced-up balance sheets.

We'll learn soon enough whether the overhaul was thorough enough to ensure the companies' future. In the process, we'll also learn whether the UAW — which will own hefty portions of both companies — can moderate its traditional goal of preserving jobs no matter what, and show greater acceptance of profit-boosting efficiencies.

If the union can do that, the remaining jobs will be more secure. Past isn't necessarily prologue: The UAW may have played a role in Detroit's decline, but now it has an opportunity to play a role in its potential comeback.

E. Thomas McClanahan is a member of the Kansas City Star editorial board.