Sentiment evolving in Congress that the United States should consider reducing or cutting off financial aid to Pakistan is shortsighted, regardless of the circumstances surrounding Osama bin Laden living there for perhaps five or six years prior to being killed by U.S. special forces on Sunday.

The suspicions that Pakistan has cooperated with terrorist elements while at the same time striving to remain a U.S. ally aren’t new. That suspicion existed within U.S. intelligence long before the Obama administration became privy to the information that bin Laden might be hiding at the Abbbottabad compound on which Sunday’s operation focused.

Instead of damaging its current relationship with Pakistan, the United States should work with that country wherever and whenever it can, realizing in the process that this ally cannot be accorded its full trust, as the situation regarding bin Laden proves.

It’s hard to fathom that no one high in the Pakistani government or its security force was aware that bin Laden was virtually within arm’s reach of them. That thinking is behind the opinion of some lawmakers that billions of dollars in economic and military aid already targeted for that country should be scaled back or fully withdrawn.

Heading the reasons why the United States should not inflict any financial punishment on Pakistan, regardless of the circumstances that allowed bin Laden to live in relative comfort there for such an extended period, is Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

A breakdown in U.S.-Pakistani relations could open the window someday for terrorists to gain access to its nuclear weapons stockpile. While estimates of that stockpile vary, the most recent estimate, published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists last year, indicated that Pakistan has 70 to 90 nuclear warheads.

The United States Government, concerned about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and weapons, reportedly has had contingency plans in place since 2004 to send in special forces to protect them if they ever are endangered.

Pakistan’s willingness to play what is regarded as a “double game” is understandable. That dual allegiance is aimed at protecting and advancing its national aims.

History contains examples of questionable relationships that this country has maintained, with the goal of advancing its interests. And, although the fact has been disputed, bin Laden allegedly was the recipient of U.S. arms — either directly or indirectly — in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Therefore, the post-bin Laden issue of whether Pakistan is a friend or a foe is less relevant than protecting the world from terrorist-spawned nuclear chaos. The world must not be held hostage by al-Qaida or anyone else.

Pakistan needs U.S. aid. The five-year, $7.5 billion economic and military aid package already pledged is — all considered — a good investment. So is the financial help to Pakistan that the United States can engineer by way of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other international lending institutions.

Even Pakistan’s criticism of the United States on Tuesday for conducting the raid against bin Laden without first seeking Pakistan’s permission should be looked at in terms of the broad picture and the overall image Pakistan is trying to maintain.

“Such actions undermine cooperation and may also constitute a threat to international peace and security,” the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said, in its criticism of the U.S.

But that mild rebuke doesn’t indicate a mood within the Pakistani government that it should divorce itself from its relationship with the U.S. and U.S. help.

Neither will the calls for re-evaluating U.S. aid to Pakistan — despite what currently is being said — go very far in the long run, as the big picture is debated.

A deteriorating relationship with Pakistan would be counterproductive not only to the United States, but to the world.