Like a drunken driver walking away from a fatal car accident, it looks like some of the people responsible for the current financial crisis on Wall Street have already walked away unscathed, living comfortably on big bonuses from recent years.

While the country struggles to comprehend the scope of the financial turmoil rooted in risky subprime mortgages, there is talk of increasing federal regulation of Wall Street. It's a topic on the presidential campaign trail this week, and Congress will no doubt begin to look at reforms to better monitor risk and leverage in the financial markets.

With the benefit of hindsight, both presidential candidates and many in Congress are not only promising change, but also vowing such a crisis would not occur on their watch.

But there is evidence to suggest otherwise.

A New York Times article from September 2003 reported that the Bush administration was proposing the creation of a new agency to oversee Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The oversight plan was a reflection of the White House belief that existing oversight over the two mortgage giants was broken or inadequate.

The new plan came out of earlier concerns that arose over manipulated financial statements that misled investors. But past efforts to increase oversight over the mortgage giants were rebuffed by lobbyists hired by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Given the just-announced government bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, it is worth noting the words of U.S. Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., who in 2003 said, "These two entities — Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — are not facing any kind of financial crisis." Frank, the ranking Democrat on the Financial Services Committee, continued, "The more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing."

Clearly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were, in fact, involved in risky mortgages.

The excesses of Wall Street in terms of high-risk and complex financial instruments, as well as extreme leverage, should drive any sort of additional governmental regulation. But clearly, most in Congress were oblivious to the growing crisis, or were falsely denying the severity of the problem because they were doing the bidding of their campaign contributors from Wall Street.

The congressional enablers of the current crisis should be revealed as part of any investigation into how Wall Street's excesses were allowed to create the current crisis.

Some of the reaction to today's financial turmoil also should include something like a provision that some large companies already employ in executive compensation programs, a "clawback" provision.

The idea of clawback is that executives are forced to return bonus pay if it turns out that the bonuses were based on false financial statements.

The next level of a clawback provision, though difficult to implement, would take back big bonuses paid to executives who took unjustifiable or extraordinary risks, such as getting into subprime mortgage investments or selling derivatives.

Determining what level of risk is too high would be difficult and somewhat subjective, but given today's realities, the actions of many financial executives pushing subprime mortgages and other complex financial instruments would clearly trigger a clawback.

Another challenge facing the implementation of a broader clawback provision comes with the realization that some high-risk investments can turn out to be spectacularly successful — and profitable.

Implementing clawback will be difficult, but it could dampen the temptation to take extreme risks for a short-term gain. And it's fair.

In addition to new regulations and more transparency to help prevent a similar financial crisis from occurring again, it's important that those most responsible for today's turmoil pay a hefty price — and are not insulated by their multimillion-dollar bonuses from the boom years.

The best reaction to the current financial crisis is to look forward — and also backward.