The Bush administration, having bungled the review of the Dubai Ports World deal to take over terminal operations at six U.S. ports, has been given a great gift. The Arab company has asked for a full 45-day review into the security concerns that have aroused so much opposition among Democrats and conservative Republicans in Congress.

That gives President Bush some political breathing room. It also affords him a chance to turn this lemon into lemonade by making meaningful changes in the way port security is handled.

Since the DP-W story broke two weeks ago, one expert after another has stepped forward to assert that our ports are the most vulnerable part of the nation's security umbrella. Ships make 60,000 ports of call each year at more than 100 deep-water ports in the United States, bringing in 6 million semitrailer-sized containers along with bulk cargo, 55 percent of the nation's oil and nearly 4 million vehicles. A single terrorist attack on a single port — never mind the familiar nuke-in-a-box scenario — would strike crippling fear into the U.S. and world economy.

Nearly all of these ships are registered in foreign countries, some of which are landlocked but issue flags of convenience because there's money in it. Many of them are owned by shell companies whose real owners are anonymous. They often are crewed by officers and merchant seamen from Third World nations, many of them part of the Islamic world, who can and do sail under phony documents. The ships are loaded at foreign ports at terminals operated by companies from the Islamic world, by crews who often have less documentation than the seamen.

Against that stands the United States Coast Guard: 4,400 men and women in uniform and 5,800 civilians. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has required ships to give four days' notice before arriving at a U.S. port, barely enough time to try to track registry. If the Coast Guard is suspicious, it will interdict a ship at sea, but it is not humanly possible to inspect hundreds of cargo containers packed tightly aboard ship, much less check the credentials of everyone on board.

And when a ship does pull into port, it goes to a terminal operated most often by a foreign company. The Coast Guard already checks the credentials of terminal employees, as well as union longshoremen. But the terminals are usually separated from the surrounding streets by a simple wire fence. If someone wanted to break in, he wouldn't have to be Harry Houdini.

Thus, the problem of an Arab-owned company operating a terminal probably sounds like a bigger problem than it actually is. Compared to the other vulnerabilities of the maritime transport system, it's pretty far down the list.

In the next six weeks, Bush has a chance to engage the best minds in the industry to address what real security improvements can be made. It is a global problem that will require international cooperation among law enforcement, military and private industry representatives.

The Homeland Security Department, given its recent track record, is not an ideal place to start. Bush should appoint a blue-ribbon task force — answerable to the president, not to Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff — and give it the authority, independence and funding it needs to address the problem.