Court OK of property takings deserves to be reversed
Should government be able to take away your home merely because a powerful corporation could use the land in a way that produces more “economic development”? Last Thursday’s deeply flawed Supreme Court decision in the case of Kelo v. New London Development Corp. says yes. In a 5-4 decision, the court allowed the city of New London, Conn., to condemn 10 homes and five other properties solely on the grounds that transferring the land to private developers might improve the city’s economy and increase tax revenue.
Under the Fifth Amendment, government may only take private property for a “public use.” As Justice Thomas explains in his strong dissent, the original meaning of “public use” was either actual public ownership of the condemned property or at the very least a legal right of access by the public. It did not mean a mere potential benefit to the public from transferring the land to private interests. Junking this rule is both legally unsound and an invitation for abuses.
Allowing takings for “economic development” is almost a blank check for the abuse of government power for the benefit of private interests. Virtually any developer or corporate interest can claim that transferring property to them might lead to increased development or tax payments. Homeowners and nonprofit organizations such as churches are particularly vulnerable. Since they make little or no profit from their property, it can always be argued that a large for-profit business could use their land in a more economically productive way.
Some defenders of the court’s decision argue that we need not worry because the political process will prevent most abusive takings. Unfortunately, the political process is too easily captured by powerful private interests who benefit from condemnation. The victims of economic development takings are usually poor and politically weak, while the beneficiaries are often large corporations or well-connected developers.
The historical record is replete with evidence of massive eminent domain abuse. Since 1950, at least 4 million Americans, most of them poor or ethnic minorities, have been uprooted from their homes by “urban development” condemnations.
In most cases, the beneficiaries of the takings were wealthy development interests, while the poor and politically disadvantaged victims were given compensation far below the level of their actual losses. As Justice O’Connor notes in her dissent, “Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms.”
Economic development takings also do little to promote the economic growth that supposedly justifies them. The new owners of property condemned for “economic development” generally have no obligation whatsoever to actually produce any economic benefits for the community. This creates strong incentives for developers and local governments to justify takings by using inflated estimates of economic gains that they have no obligation to live up to.
In the notorious 1981 Poletown case, the city of Detroit condemned the homes of 4,200 people and spent $250 million in public funds in order to transfer the property to General Motors to build a factory. Although GM promised that the new factory would create 6,000 jobs, in fact the plant employed less than half that many and the condemnation ended up costing Detroit’s economy more than it benefited it.
In New London, the city has already spent more than $80 million in taxpayer money on its development project, yet there is still no clear indication that any developer is willing or able to use the property in a way that will inject even a fraction of this amount back into the local economy. Economic development takings usually cause more economic harm than benefit, since they lead to the destruction of homes, small businesses, and churches.
The dark cloud of Kelo is not without its small silver linings. The majority opinion and especially Justice Kennedy’s concurrence do provide slightly greater protection for property rights than did earlier Supreme Court precedents. Moreover, state courts can strengthen protection for property owners by forbidding Kelo-like takings under their state constitutions; some 10 state supreme courts have already done so.
Finally, the fact that Kelo was so close and bitterly contested holds out the hope that it may be modified or even reversed in future cases. May that day come soon.
